Communicative misalignment in Autism Spectrum Disorder by Wadge, Harshali et al.
 Communicative Misalignment in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Harshali Wadge​a​, Rebecca Brewer​b​, Geoffrey Bird​c,d​, Ivan Toni​e,*​ & Arjen Stolk​a,e,* 
 
a​Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA  
b​Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London, London, UK  
c​Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 
d​Social, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology, and 
Neuroscience, King’s College London, London, UK 
e​Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands  
*​These authors contributed equally 
Corresponding author: astolk@berkeley.edu 
  
 Abstract 
Communication deficits are a defining feature of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), manifest 
during social interactions. Previous studies investigating communicative deficits have largely 
focused on the perceptual biases, social motivation, cognitive flexibility, or mentalizing abilities 
of isolated individuals. By embedding autistic individuals in live non-verbal interactions, we 
characterized a novel cause for their communication deficits. Adults with ASD matched 
neurotypical individuals in their ability and propensity to generate and modify intelligible 
behaviors for a communicative partner. However, they struggled to align the meaning of those 
behaviors with their partner when meaning required referencing their recent communicative 
history. This communicative misalignment explains why autistic individuals are vulnerable in 
everyday interactions, which entail fleeting ambiguities, but succeed in social cognition tests 
involving stereotyped contextual cues. These findings illustrate the cognitive and clinical 
importance of considering social interaction as a communicative alignment challenge, and how 
ineffective human communication is without this key interactional ingredient. 
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 1. Introduction 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is diagnosed on the basis of communicative deficits observed 
in everyday social interactions ​(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Frith, 2003; Klin, 
McPartland, & Volkmar, 2013)​. The deficits are most evident in situations where the speaker’s 
intention and a sentence’s literal meaning strongly diverge, such as in the case of irony and 
sarcasm ​(Tesink et al., 2009; Zalla et al., 2014)​, and have been argued to be a product of a 
primary impairment in representing mental states ​(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Happé, 
1993)​. However, empirical studies of this impairment have produced mixed results, including 
compelling observations of intact social perception and reasoning in individuals with ASD 
(Bowler, 1992; Cusack, Williams, & Neri, 2015; Pantelis & Kennedy, 2017; Sally & Hill, 2006)​. 
Other accounts suggest that the communication deficits arise from core difficulties with social 
motivation, social attention, or cognitive flexibility ​(Chambon et al., 2017; Chevallier, Kohls, 
Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012; Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009)​. Yet other accounts 
emphasize biases in processing biological and multimodal linguistic cues used during 
face-to-face interactions ​(Constantino et al., 2017; J. Cook, Saygin, Swain, & Blakemore, 2009; 
Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Hutchins & Brien, 2016; Nackaerts et al., 2012; Silverman, 
Bennetto, Campana, & Tanenhaus, 2010)​. These considerations highlight severe limitations in 
our understanding of communication in ASD, and consequently a lack of principled interventions 
for improving communication between autistic and neurotypical individuals.  
Here we examined the possibility that individuals with ASD have difficulties in using the 
conceptual space defined by an ongoing interaction to resolve the pervasive ambiguity of 
human communicative signals ​(Goodman & Frank, 2016; Levinson, 1983; Stolk, Verhagen, & 
Toni, 2016)​. Human communication is often framed in terms of signal transmission, 
presupposing that communicators already share the same set of encoding-decoding rules, e.g., 
a common language ​(Akmajian, Farmer, Bickmore, Demers, & Harnish, 2017; Eco, 1976; 
Jakobson, 1971)​. Yet even commonly used words do not contain fixed meanings that are 
reliably shared across communicators ​(Grice, 1975; Rumelhart, 1979; Sperber & Wilson, 1996)​. 
Their meaning is flexibly coordinated through an online interpersonal alignment process by 
which people in dialogue seek and provide evidence that they understand one another ​(Susan 
E. Brennan, Galati, & Kuhlen, 2010; Fusaroli & Tylén, 2016; Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Misyak, 
Melkonyan, Zeitoun, & Chater, 2014; Stolk et al., 2016)​. This dynamic alignment process 
provides a conceptual frame of reference necessary for interpreting intrinsically ambiguous 
communicative signals ​(Stolk et al., 2016)​. The present study quantitatively tested whether 
 individuals with ASD have difficulties in dynamically aligning conceptualizations of their 
behaviors with a communicative partner. 
This test was implemented in a novel communicative setting in which cognitively able 
adults with ASD interacted with another individual via a digital game board (Fig. 1A). This 
two-player computer game captures the open-ended and interpersonal nature of everyday 
communication by challenging players to generate, negotiate, and align the meaning of their 
non-verbal communicative behaviors ​(de Ruiter et al., 2010)​. The design of the computer game 
remediates several factors hypothesized to account for communicative impairments in ASD. For 
instance, the game prevents recourse to pre-existing shared communicative representations, 
such as those offered by some linguistic and gestural emblems ​(Groen, Zwiers, van der Gaag, & 
Buitelaar, 2008)​, and avoids verbal and face-to-face contact between players. This nullifies the 
effects of individual differences in processing biological and multimodal linguistic cues 
(Constantino et al., 2017; J. Cook et al., 2009; Hobson et al., 1988; Hutchins & Brien, 2016; 
Nackaerts et al., 2012; Silverman et al., 2010)​. Furthermore, the game manipulates the 
ambiguity of the communicative signals by introducing problems that are more easily solved in 
light of previous interactions. This feature mimics daily conversation, which consists of 
ambiguous words and behaviors that can only be discerned by individuals who know their 
context of use in an ongoing interaction. Under these controlled yet genuinely interactive 
experimental circumstances, it becomes feasible to quantitatively test whether communicative 
deficits in individuals with ASD arise specifically from difficulties establishing dynamic 
conceptual alignment of ambiguous signals with another person.  
 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Participants  
Fifty-two adult participants were recruited to take part in this study (M ± SD 23.9 ± 6.5 yrs of 
age, 20 females, 22 individuals with ASD). ASD participants were recruited from a database of 
research volunteers maintained by the authors. Typical participants were recruited from local 
participant pools populated by students of the University of London and members of the general 
public, and were selected to match the ASD sample on age, gender, and IQ (see below). 
Participants were assigned pairwise to either the ASD group (7 pairs, each containing two 
individuals with ASD), the Typical group (11 pairs, each containing two individuals with no 
clinical diagnosis), or the Mixed group (8 pairs, each including one individual with ASD and one 
individual with no clinical diagnosis). The Mixed group served as a control for behavioral 
 changes related to the clinical status of the communicative partners in the full ASD and Typical 
groups.​ ​All study procedures received ethical approval by the local institution’s ethics committee 
and all participants provided informed consent in line with the declaration of Helsinki. Analysis 
took place after completion of data collection.  
Individuals with and without ASD did not differ in terms of age ​(​24.7 ± 6.5 vs. 23.2 ± 6.6, 
t​(50) = 0.79, ​p​ = .44, ​d​ = 0.23, 95% CI = [-0.33 0.78], ​BF​ = 2.76 in favor of the null hypothesis of 
no difference) or ​gender (6/22 vs. 14/30 females, ​X​2​(1,52)​ = 2.02, ​p​ = .16, ​d​ = 0.19, 95% CI = 
[-0.06 0.45], ​BF​ = 1.16 in favor of the null hypothesis​). They also did not differ in terms of IQ 
(​102.1 ± 19.4 vs. 109.4 ± 14.1, ​t​(50) = -1.59, ​p ​= .12, ​d​ = -0.46, 95% CI = [-1.01 0.10], ​BF​ = 1.28 
in favor of the null hypothesis​), measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI-II, ​(Wechsler, 2011)​) in neurotypical individuals, and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS-IV, ​(Wechsler, 2008)​) in those with ASD. Autistic traits were assessed in all 
individuals using the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ, ​(Baron-Cohen, Hoekstra, Knickmeyer, & 
Wheelwright, 2006)​), and were more prevalent in individuals with ASD than in neurotypical 
participants (32.6 ± 8.4 vs. 16.0 ± 8.0, ​t​(50) = 7.23, ​p​ < .001, ​d​ = 2.07, 95% CI = [1.39 2.75]).​ All 
individuals with ASD were diagnosed by an independent clinician, and completed the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-2, ​(Lord et al., 2012)​). Six of the ASD participants met 
the ADOS criteria for Autism, while nine met the criteria for Autism Spectrum. Seven individuals 
with ASD did not meet ADOS criteria despite their clinical diagnosis, but were diagnosed by an 
independent clinician and reported a similar degree of autistic traits on the AQ as the individuals 
who did meet the ADOS criteria (31.5 ± 10.2, 32.1 ± 9.7, and 33.9 ± 5.7 for the Autism, Autism 
Spectrum, and the None group, respectively). Independent samples t-tests did not indicate 
differences in AQ scores between these three groups (all ​p​ > .62, all ​BF​ > 1.88 in favor of the 
null ​hypothesis​). Supplemental Table S1 represents an overview of AQ scores and ADOS 
classifications for all individuals diagnosed with ASD. 
 
2.2. Task  
We used the same two-player communication game employed in a previous experiment ​(Stolk, 
Verhagen, et al., 2013)​. The game involves pairs of participants interacting on a digital game 
board with a 3 x 3 grid layout, which was visually presented on each participant’s computer 
screen (Fig. 1A). Each pair communicated in real-time over the course of 80 interactions, 
alternating between the roles of Communicator and Addressee across successive interactions. 
During each interaction, their goal was to reproduce a target configuration of two geometric 
 shapes on the game board. Each member of the pair controlled the movement of one of these 
shapes. The target configuration was shown to the Communicator only and thus a successful 
interaction required the Communicator to convey to the Addressee the target location and 
orientation of the Addressee’s shape, while also ensuring that the final location and orientation 
of their own shape was as specified by the target configuration. In this game, the only means 
available to the Communicator for communicating with the Addressee is by moving the 
Communicator’s own shape around the grid using horizontal and vertical translations, and 90° 
clockwise rotations controlled by button presses on a handheld game controller (four face 
buttons and one shoulder button, respectively). The only means available to the Addressee for 
completing the configuration is by inferring the target location and orientation of his or her own 
shape on the basis of the movements of the Communicator, and positioning it accordingly using 
a second handheld game controller. 
At interaction onset, each player is assigned their role (Communicator or Addressee) 
and shape (event I in Fig. 1A), followed by presentation of the target configuration to the 
Communicator (event II). Both Communicator and Addressee know that the Communicator has 
unlimited time available for planning the movements of the Communicator’s shape, but only 10 
seconds to execute them (event III). As soon as the Communicator presses the start/stop 
button, the target configuration disappears from the Communicator’s screen and the 
Communicator’s shape appears in the center of the grid on both participants’ screens, signaling 
readiness to move. All movements are then visible on both the Communicator’s and 
Addressee’s screens. After 10 seconds, or earlier if the Communicator presses the start/stop 
button for a second time, the Communicator’s shape cannot move further and the Addressee’s 
shape appears in the center of the grid, indicating control by the Addressee over the 
Addressee’s own shape. Similarly, the Addressee has no time constraints on planning the 
movements of their shape, but only 10 seconds to position it in a location and orientation 
deemed correct on the basis of the movements of the Communicator (event IV). Finally, after 10 
seconds, or earlier if the Addressee presses the start/stop button again, the same feedback is 
presented to both players in the form of a green check mark or red cross, indicating whether or 
not the participants had successfully reproduced the target configuration (event V). The 80 
target configurations were presented in the same predetermined order to all 26 participant pairs. 
There are no a priori correct communication strategies in this game nor can the 
Addressee solve the task by simply reproducing the movements of the Communicator’s shape. 
Rather, the Addressee needs to disambiguate communicative and instrumental components of 
 the Communicator’s movements, and identify the relationship between the Communicator’s 
movements and the message they intend to convey. Several pieces of evidence indicate that 
the players jointly and dynamically establish an agreement, also known as a ‘conceptual pact’ 
(S. E. Brennan & Clark, 1996)​, concerning the meaning of their behaviors. For instance, the 
same communicative behavior can be used by different pairs to convey different meanings. The 
same behavior can even have different meanings in different interactions of the same pair when 
the communicative agreement is jointly revised, and across various pairs (for examples see 
movies in ​(Stolk, Noordzij, Verhagen, et al., 2014; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013)​). To drive 
participants to continuously (re)negotiate the meaning of their communicative behaviors rather 
than to exploit already-established communicative conventions, we increased task difficulty 
across successive interactions. This was achieved by introducing deliberate mismatches 
between the geometrical characteristics of the pairs’ shapes, and by introducing target 
orientations incompatible with the Communicator’s shape. For instance, if a Communicator was 
able to successfully communicate the target orientation of the Addressee’s shape by rotating 
their own shape, this strategy would be negated when the Communicator’s shape changed to a 
circle and the Addressee’s to a triangle. The Communicator would then have to find a new way 
to indicate the target orientation of the Addressee’s shape, because rotations of the circle shape 
would not be visible. A further level of difficulty could be introduced by maintaining the same 
circle-triangle shape combination, but having the Addressee’s triangle point outside the grid. If 
the Communicator had previously used a signal that involved repeatedly stepping in and out of 
the Addressee’s target location in the direction of the target orientation (as seen in Fig. 1A), an 
interaction where the Addressee’s triangle pointed outside of the grid would be impossible to 
solve using that signal. Therefore, the Communicator would have to devise a new behavior to 
solve this new problem type.  
Prior to task performance, participants completed an individual training session in order 
to familiarize themselves with the handheld game controller, ensuring that each could 
manipulate their shape quickly and accurately. Given that atypical movements kinematics have 
been reported in ASD ​(J. L. Cook, Blakemore, & Press, 2013)​, we extended the allotted 
movement time for Communicator and Addressee from 5 to 10 seconds in this study, which was 
found to be sufficient for participants with ASD to execute their planned movements. 
Participants also jointly completed 20 practice interactions to familiarize themselves with the 
communicative setting and the sequence of events occurring during an interaction. To minimize 
any effect stemming from potential individual differences in working memory capacity, we 
 allowed Communicators to refer to a hard copy of the target configuration throughout the 
interaction. The order of trials was consistent across participant pairs. The experiment was 
programmed using Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA) software on a 
Windows XP personal computer, and lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
 
2.3. Analysis  
Participants’ behaviors, communicative success, and alignment of communicative signal use 
were analyzed offline using custom MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA), Python (Python 
Software Foundation, DE, USA) and Java code (Oracle, CA, USA), the SPSS (IBM, Armonk, 
NY, USA) and JASP (JASP Team, jasp-stats.org) statistical software packages, and the Gephi 
(Gephi Consortium, gephi.org) network visualization software package. Communicative success 
was calculated as the percentage of spatial configurations successfully reproduced by each pair 
over the course of their interactions.  
Pairwise alignment was calculated as the percentage of interaction-by-interaction 
overlap in signals used by pair members in the Communicator role for communicating the target 
location and orientation of the Addressee’s shape. The pair members were considered aligned 
at a given interaction if the type of communicative signal used in that interaction was 
conceptually identical (irrespective of movement speed and trial-specific trajectories) to the 
signal in the interactions preceding or following it, when the other member of the pair was the 
Communicator (Fig. 1C). The bidirectional sensitivity of the measure captures conceptual 
alignment even in instances where new communicative signals are introduced, and avoids 
ascribing transient task difficulty-related to signal changes to misalignment. Furthermore, unlike 
the inherently joint measure of communicative success, alignment can be calculated between 
members of different pairs. As outlined below, these pseudo-pair combinations provided a 
quantitative index of a problem’s ambiguity, for testing whether autistic and neurotypical pairs 
differed in their ability to achieve alignment as a function of problem ambiguity.  
An experimenter familiar with the communicative task (author H.W.) performed an 
interaction-by-interaction classification of the communicative signals using a custom-made 
replayer tool, while remaining blind to the clinical status of each participant. The signals varied 
from common pauses for distinguishing a target location from other visited locations, to 
idiosyncratic drawing, rotation, or ‘wiggling’ behaviors (stepping out from and back into a 
location, e.g., the double-arrowed number 2 action in Fig. 1A) for conveying the target location 
and orientation of the Addressee’s shape. A list of signals and their descriptions was 
 constructed on the basis of previously identified behaviors from using this game ​(Blokpoel et al., 
2012; Stolk, Noordzij, Verhagen, et al., 2014; Volman, Noordzij, & Toni, 2012)​. In cases where 
no pre-existing description was considered sufficiently accurate for an observed behavior, a new 
description was created for that communicative behavior. A total of 18 unique signals were 
observed, see Supplemental Table S2. It should be emphasized that in this game it cannot be 
determined on the basis of a single interaction alone whether, for instance, a wiggling behavior 
is intended to emphatically indicate the direction in which the Addressee’s shape needs to point, 
or whether the number of wiggles corresponds to the number of clockwise rotations required for 
the Addressee’s shape to reach the target orientation. Moreover, the communicative signals not 
only need to be disambiguated from other signals but also from instrumental elements of a 
Communicator’s behavior which are necessary to achieve the Communicator’s own target 
location and orientation. We controlled for subjectivity in the interpretation of the inherently 
ambiguous communicative behaviors in two ways. First, we asked a second rater to perform an 
interaction-by-interaction classification of the same dataset using the descriptions of behaviors 
observed by the first rater. We based our analyses on the classifications of the second rater 
given that the second rater was unaware of the details of this study. Second, we report 
statistical inferences based on the measure of pairwise alignment. Pairwise alignment is less 
prone to rater-specific interpretation and labeling of communicative signals, given that it 
considers the parity of signals across each pair’s interactions as classified by the same rater. To 
validate the final signal classifications and resulting alignment values, we compared these 
measures between the two raters. The raters’ individual signal classifications overlapped by 
82% (intraclass correlation = 0.97, Kappa = 0.78). The subsequent alignment values for each 
pair overlapped by 84% (intraclass correlation = 0.81, Kappa = 0.68). 
The main analysis tested for between-group differences in joint communicative success 
and pairwise alignment of communicative signals, over and above individual differences in 
general cognitive function. The fixed effect of Group (ASD, Mixed, Typical) was assessed with 
two univariate ANCOVAs using pairs’ communicative success and pairwise alignment as 
dependent variables, respectively ​(Fisher, 1925)​. The covariate in these analyses considered 
the inter-pair variance in general cognitive function accounted for by the IQ in each pair ​(Reber, 
Walkenfeld, & Hernstadt, 1991)​. We selected between the mean and minimum IQ in a pair to 
describe this relationship, with the latter providing a better fit to communicative success (​F​(1,24) 
= 16.17, ​p​ = .001, ​R​2​adj​ = 0.38) than the former (​F​(1,24) = 4.72, ​p​ = .04, ​R​2​adj​ = 0.16). We 
report values adjusted for IQ where appropriate to resolve the variability in the pairwise 
 measures. The sources of the between pair differences in communicative success and pairwise 
alignment were further qualified with post-hoc comparisons using Fisher’s least significant 
difference (LSD). The predictive strength of pairwise alignment on communicative success was 
determined using linear regression analysis. We report effect size estimates (partial ​η​2​ and 
Cohen’s ​d​) and 95% confidence intervals for each ANOVA and post-hoc comparison to facilitate 
cumulative science ​(Lakens, 2013)​. We report Bayes Factors (BF) for statistical tests evaluating 
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. Bayes Factors express the relative likelihood of the 
data under the models at hand. 
A follow-up analysis tested for between-group differences in the dynamic relationship 
between pairwise alignment and problem ambiguity. The fixed effect of Group (ASD, Mixed, 
Typical) was assessed with a univariate ANOVA of Pearson’s correlations between the two 
dependent variables and further qualified using post-hoc comparisons as in the main analysis. 
Problem ambiguity was measured as 1 minus the average pairwise alignment in pseudo-pairs, 
which is calculated in the same way as in the original pairs (Fig. 1C), and indicates consistent 
signal use across at least two consecutive trials by two members who are originally from 
different pairs, e.g.​, between individual 1 of pair A and individual 2 of pair B. This pairing 
produces a total of 650 possible pseudo-pair combinations between members of all 26 pairs. 
Averaging the alignment across all pseudo-pairs for each trial results in the trial-by-trial 
chance-distribution seen in Figure 1F. In this distribution, a trial has low ambiguity because 
pseudo-pairs were frequently aligned in their signal use for that problem, indicating consistent 
signal use across individuals regardless of communicative history. For instance, target 
configurations​ that did not require Addressees to rotate their shapes to reach a target 
orientation (e.g., circle-circle combinations presented in early interactions, as seen in Fig. 1F, 
trial 3) tended to evoke consistent solutions across pairs. On these trials, Communicators 
needed to distinguish Addressees’ target locations from other locations visited on the game 
board in their movement, which several Communicators achieved by using a brief movement 
pause on the Addressees’ target location (signal A).​ Conversely, high ambiguity trials were 
solved more easily with signals that had been negotiated and coordinated through pairs’ unique 
communicative histories. For instance, ​problems involving mismatches between the shapes’ 
geometrical characteristics and that require Addressees to rotate (e.g., circle-triangle 
combinations, in later interactions such as trial 39, shown in Fig. 1F) were often solved with 
different signals by different pairs (cf. signals E through S in Supplemental Table S2). ​Therefore, 
pseudo-pairs had lower alignment during these trials. 
 A network analysis provided further insight into how Typical and ASD pairs navigated 
their solution space over the course of 80 interactions. To visualize the distribution of 
individually and jointly visited solutions in each pair, networks consisting of ​two sets of edges 
(indicated by color, one for each member) followed the two pair members’ signals at each trial. 
The blue edges represented player 1, and connected the nodes for odd trials (1, 3, 5, 7, and so 
on). The orange edges represented player 2, and connected the nodes for even trials (2, 4, 6, 8, 
and so on). All 80 trials, represented as nodes and connected by their Communicators’ 
corresponding edges, were then clustered by signal type to visualize each player’s solution 
space in respect to the other. ​A Fruchterman Reingold algorithm ​(Fruchterman & Reingold, 
1991)​, implemented in Gephi, minimized the energy of the system by moving the nodes and 
changing the forces between them. This provided a two-dimensional layout of the pairwise 
trajectories through the pairs’ solution spaces. Hamming distance, a metric used to measure 
differences in networks ​(Hamming, 1950)​, was calculated between pair members’ solution 
spaces to show how much the members differed in their solution sets.  
 
2.4. Additional analyses  
Five additional analyses were used to assess the specificity of communicative success and 
pairwise alignment, beginning with two control analyses. First, we tested whether ASD-related 
differences in these variables were driven by generic motor-related differences between 
individuals in each group, using a multivariate ANOVA with a between-participants factor of 
Group (ASD, Typical) and the dependent variables of planning time, movement time, number of 
moves and time spent on target and other locations of the game board. Second, we tested 
whether the reduced pairwise alignment in ASD could be a consequence of this sample 
population generating a reduced number of intelligible solutions to the novel communicative 
problems, owing, for example, to perseveration being common in ASD ​(Geurts et al., 2009; Hill, 
2004)​. To test this possibility, we calculated the number of distinguishable signals that were 
used in the interactions by each participant in the Communicator role, and tested for 
between-group differences using an independent samples t-test. We additionally examined 
whether individuals with ASD differed in the type of communicative signals they generated, 
using a Chi-squared test to assess the between-group overlap in signals used as a fraction of 
the total number of signals observed across both groups. An additional Kullback-Leibler 
divergence test was used to measure the difference between the two groups’ signal frequency 
distributions. Third, we assessed whether the reduced conceptual alignment in ASD could be a 
 consequence of this sample population not being able or motivated to change their 
communicative signal following a misunderstanding during the last time they were the 
Communicator, by testing for between-group differences in signal changes (in interaction i) 
following an error (interaction i - 2) using an independent samples t-test. Fourth, we assessed 
whether between-group differences in communicative success and pairwise alignment could be 
attributed to differences in a motivation to communicate. To this end, we used a 
repeated-measures ANOVA to test for between-group differences (ASD, Typical) in the 
communicative emphasis participants in the Communicator role spontaneously placed on the 
Addressee’s target location relative to other visited locations (Target, Non-target). These two 
analyses were adopted from other similar studies ​(Stolk, D’Imperio, di Pellegrino, & Toni, 2015; 
Stolk, Hunnius, Bekkering, & Toni, 2013; Stolk, Verhagen, et al., 2013)​. Fifth, we assessed 
whether communication impairment in ASD resulted selectively from an inability to align 
production and not interpretation of a behavior to a partner. For this exploratory analysis, we 
used a repeated-measures ANOVA to test for between-group differences (ASD, Typical) in 
communicative success in the role of Communicator and Addressee. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Communication impairment 
To quantify communicative abilities, we asked participant pairs to communicate over the course 
of 80 interactions, alternating between the roles of Communicator and Addressee. In any given 
interaction, the Communicator and Addressee must recreate a spatial configuration of two 
assigned shapes on the digital game board. The target configuration is only shown to the 
Communicator (event II in Fig. 1A), who must use his or her own assigned shape to relay to the 
Addressee his or her target location (event III, hereafter referred to as a ‘communicative signal’). 
The Communicator must then reach his or her own target position. The Addressee, who has not 
seen the target configuration, must then infer his or her target position based on the 
Communicator’s communicative signal and move accordingly (event IV). After the Addressee 
has moved, the same feedback is presented to both players to indicate communicative success, 
i.e., whether or not they jointly reproduced the target configuration (event V). Fifty-two adult 
participants were recruited to take part in this study: 22 individuals with ASD and 30 
neurotypical individuals, matched on gender, age, and IQ. Participants were assigned pairwise 
to either the ASD group (7 pairs), the Typical group (11 pairs), or the Mixed group (8 pairs, each 
including one individual with ASD and one individual with no clinical diagnosis). Confirming the 
 study’s predictions, the three groups differed in their overall communicative success (​F​(2,22) = 
11.40, ​p​ < .001, partial ​η​2​ = 0.51). As seen in Figure 1B, this effect was driven by pairs 
containing one or more individuals with ASD (ASD and Mixed pairs) successfully solving fewer 
communicative problems than Typical pairs (Typical versus ASD, ​p ​< .001, ​d​ = 2.41, 95% CI = 
[1.18 3.65]; Typical versus Mixed, ​p​ = .048, ​d​ = 1.06, 95% CI = [0.09 2.04]; Mixed versus ASD, 
p ​= .047, ​d​ = 1.27, 95% CI = [0.16 2.38]), providing quantitative evidence for communication 
impairment as a core diagnostic feature of ASD ​(American Psychiatric Association, 2013)​. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 - Communication impairment and misalignment in ASD.​ (​A​) The joint goal of Communicator 
and Addressee is to reproduce a target configuration of their two given shapes on a digital game board, 
shown only to the Communicator (event II). Given that the Addressee cannot see the target configuration, 
a successful interaction requires the Communicator and Addressee to construct and comprehend how the 
behavior of the Communicator’s shape indicates the target location and orientation of the Addressee’s 
shape (a ‘communicative signal’, event III). (​B​) Pairs containing one or more individuals diagnosed with 
ASD (ASD and Mixed pairs) jointly solved fewer communicative problems than pairs containing two 
individuals with no clinical diagnosis (Typical pairs). (​C ​and​ D​) Pairwise alignment measured the 
percentage of interaction-by-interaction overlap in signals produced by pair members, and revealed less 
frequent dynamic alignment of communicative signal use in ASD pairs than in the other pair types. Pairs 
were considered aligned at a given interaction if the type of communicative signal used in that interaction 
was identical to the signal in the interactions directly preceding or following it, when the other member of 
the pair was the Communicator. Letter indices correspond to a descriptive list of observed signals 
 (Supplemental Table S2). (​E​) Pairwise alignment predicted communicative success across pairs. Lines 
show linear fit and mean 95% confidence intervals. (​F ​and​ G​) Pairwise alignment was also calculated for 
pseudo-pairs, constituted of members from different pairs. Given that pseudo-pair members lack any 
interpersonal coordination, their distribution of trial-by-trial alignment (dashed black line) provided a 
quantitative index of problem ambiguity, where low ambiguity indicated high pseudo-pair alignment 
because those configurations evoked consistent solutions across different pairs, cf. interactions 3 and 39. 
The bar graph indicates that ASD and Mixed pairs’ alignment tended to follow the distribution of pairwise 
alignment found in the pseudo-pairs, whereas Typical pairs achieved alignment even when the problem 
space afforded multiple solutions. Lines' spread indicates ±1 SEM. A version of the line graph with trials 
ordered from lowest to highest ambiguity can be seen in Supplemental Figure S1. (​H​) Network 
visualizations of four pairs’ trajectories through their idiosyncratic solution spaces. The nodes represent 
the signals constructed by the Communicator of each interaction and are clustered to show signals that 
were used repeatedly. The colored edges connect each individual’s consecutively produced signals as 
Communicators (blue for individual 1, orange for individual 2). ASD pairs showed more individual 
exploration than Typical pairs of their solution space, as indicated by relatively large clusters of 
individually-visited solutions (clusters of nodes that were connected only by edges of a single color) and 
small clusters of jointly-visited solutions.  
 
3.2. Communicative misalignment 
The task is primarily designed to quantify and manipulate interpersonal alignment in 
communication. Similar to how idiosyncratic shared constructs emerge from everyday dialogue 
(S. E. Brennan & Clark, 1996)​, this task allows pairs to converge on unique meanings for the 
same behavior. For instance, some pairs solve the communicative problem illustrated in Figure 
1A by stepping in and out multiple times from the Addressee’s target location, to indicate the 
direction in which the Addressee’s shape needs to point. Other pairs use the exact same 
communicative signal to indicate the number of rotations the Addressee needs to apply to 
his/her shape to obtain the desired orientation (Supplemental Table S2 provides a list of 
identified signals). These examples also illustrate how the meaning of the ambiguous signals 
produced in this game cannot be determined from a single interaction. A pair has converged on 
a shared meaning for a signal only if both individuals manage to comprehend and reproduce 
that signal successfully. Therefore, pairs were considered aligned during a given interaction if its 
Communicator used a communicative signal that was conceptually identical to the signal used 
in the interactions directly preceding or following it, when the other member of the pair was the 
Communicator (Fig. 1C). This trial-by-trial alignment is analogous to two communicators using 
 an ambiguous word or gesture that only they would know the exact meaning of. Their ability to 
produce and understand this behavior is proof of their pair-specific conceptual agreement. 
To manipulate alignment over the course of the task, target configurations with multiple 
possible solutions were introduced in a consistent and deliberate order. This experimental 
manipulation makes it possible to calculate a trial-by-trial chance-distribution of pseudo-pairs’ 
communicative alignment, containing for each trial the average pairwise alignment of 
communicative signals between members of different pairs (dashed black line in Fig. 1F). Given 
that pseudo-pair members lack any interpersonal coordination, their distribution of trial-by-trial 
alignment allows us to quantitatively differentiate between configurations which evoke 
consistent solutions across pairs and configurations solved with different signals by different 
pairs (cf. interactions 3 and 39 in Fig. 1F). We took these differences in the solution space to 
indicate problem ambiguity, where high ambiguity equated to a larger set of empirically 
observed signals used to solve that problem. We predicted problem ambiguity to strongly 
modulate alignment in pairs containing one or more individuals with ASD, consistent with their 
inability to establish conceptual alignment.  
The main finding of this study quantitatively illustrates that reduced conceptual alignment 
explains communicative impairment in ASD. Comparison of signals used across contiguous 
interactions showed differing alignment across the three groups (​F​(2,22) = 9.07, ​p​ = .001, partial 
η​2​ = 0.45). As shown in Figure 1D and Movies ​S1​ and ​S2​, full ASD pairs aligned their 
communicative signals across contiguous interactions less frequently than the other pair types 
(Typical versus ASD, ​p​ < .001, ​d​ = 2.11, 95% CI = [0.94 3.29]; Mixed versus ASD, ​p​ = .003, ​d​ = 
2.03, 95% CI = [0.78 3.28]; Typical versus Mixed, ​p​ = .99, ​d​ = 0.01, 95% CI = [-0.90 0.92]). This 
analysis leads to two independent observations about conceptual alignment. First, a correlation 
analysis showed a strong relationship between alignment and success across all pairs, 
confirming conceptual misalignment as a predictor of communicative impairment (​F​(1,24) = 
32.79, ​p ​< .001, ​R​2​adj​ = 0.56, ​r​ = 0.76, 95% CI = [0.53 0.89]), see Figure 1E. Second, full- and 
mixed-ASD pairs largely followed the distribution of communicative alignment found in 
pseudo-pairs, during both unambiguous and ambiguous problems (Fig. 1F and G). This 
observation indicates that the interaction dynamics of full- and mixed-ASD pairs were 
comparable to those of pairs of individuals with no previous communication. In contrast, Typical 
pairs achieved higher alignment than pseudo-pairs even during ambiguous problems, indicating 
that individuals in Typical pairs capitalized on their communicative history. These 
between-group differences are supported by a statistical analysis testing for the effect of 
 problem ambiguity on pairwise alignment (​F​(2,23) = 8.51, ​p​ = .002, partial ​η​2​ = 0.43; Typical 
versus ASD, ​p​ = .001, ​d​ = 2.02, 95% CI = [0.86 3.17]; Typical versus Mixed, ​p ​= .012, ​d​ = 1.34, 
95% CI = [0.33 2.34]; Mixed versus ASD,​ p​ = .24, ​d​ = 0.68, 95% CI = [-0.36 1.73]).  
The group-based observations are also supported by descriptive analyses of pairwise 
trajectories through their idiosyncratic solution spaces, where pair members' signals at every 
interaction are represented as nodes in a network (Fig. 1H). These networks allowed us to 
follow individual pair members' behaviors in relation to one another, and visualize patterns of 
exploration and alignment through the solution space. It can be seen that in Typical pairs, both 
individuals frequently used the same signal (e.g., signals J and C in pair X; signals R and Q in 
pair Y), while occasionally exploring other solutions (e.g., signals K, H, and I in pair X; signal J in 
pair Y). However, those options were not pursued further if the other pair member did not adopt 
those signals. The large size of shared clusters, and the point-like structure of the 
individually-visited solutions, confirm that Typical pairs develop strong conceptual agreements 
across the 80 interactions. In contrast, ASD pairs show more individually-visited solutions and 
small clusters of jointly-visited solutions, the exception being large clusters of signal A that was 
used predominantly during problems requiring no rotation by the Addressee (e.g., circle-circle 
problem configurations). As seen through the spread of behaviors by each member, these pairs 
were able to explore signals, but unlike Typical pairs, struggled to converge on shared signals. 
This is supported by an analysis comparing the dissimilarity between signal sets produced by 
members of ASD and neurotypical pairs (Hamming distance: 0.67 ± 0.04 vs. 0.50 ± 0.04, M ± 
SEM, ​t​(16) = 2.84, ​p​ = .012, ​d​ = 1.46, 95% CI = [0.40 2.52]). Thus, members of ASD pairs 
produced signals that were largely independent from those of their partners, and failed to reach 
conceptual alignment. 
 
3.3. Preserved cognitive abilities and communicative propensities 
The experimental setting and additional empirical observations exclude several proposed 
causes for the communicative impairment observed in individuals with ASD. First, planning time, 
movement time, number of moves, time spent on target and other locations of the game board 
were consistently matched between neurotypical and individuals with ASD (Fig. 2A, ​F​(5,46) = 
2.00, ​p​ = .10, partial ​η​2​ = 0.18). This finding indicates that the communicative impairment is not 
a consequence of the sensorimotor demands of the task, nor of misapprehension of its 
communicative demands. Second, individuals with and without ASD exhibited a comparable 
heterogeneity of communicative behaviors throughout their interactions (Fig. 2A, 5.41 ± 0.35 vs. 
 5.07 ± 0.24 distinguishable signals in each participant, M ± SEM, ​t​(50) = 0.84, ​p​ = .40, ​d​ = 0.29, 
95% CI = [-0.27 0.84], ​BF​ = 2.66 in favor of the null hypothesis​; 13 out of 18 identical signals 
across both groups, ​X​2​(1,18) = 7.1, ​p​ = .008, ​d​ = 0.44, 95% CI = [0.15 0.74]; Kullback-Leibler 
divergence of signal frequency distributions = 0.016), indicating that the communicative 
misalignment was not due to perseveration commonly associated with ASD. Moreover, 
individuals in both groups were similarly inclined to re-use signals that were previously 
understood by their partner (Fig. 2A, Kullback-Leibler divergence of success rate distributions = 
0.029), showing that misalignment persisted despite an intact ability to remember and learn 
from successful interactions. Furthermore, individuals with ASD were also similarly inclined to 
change their signal following a communicative failure (Fig. 2B, ​t​(50) = 1.28, ​p​ = .21, ​d​ = 0.37, 
95% CI = [-0.19 0.92], ​BF​ = 1.83 in favor of the null hypothesis​), excluding the possibility that 
reduced success or misalignment was due to a failure to detect or react to a misunderstanding 
with their partner. Third, similar to neurotypical individuals, individuals with ASD spontaneously 
spent more time on communicatively relevant locations of the game board (Fig. 2C, main effect 
of location ​F​(1,50) = 188.88, ​p​ < .001, partial ​η​2​ = 0.79; no main effect of group or interaction 
involving ASD and location, both ​p​ > .15), indicating that they were willing to invest resources in 
switching between communicative and instrumental portions of their actions to mark a 
communicatively relevant location for the benefit of their partner. Finally, communicative 
success was lowest when individuals with ASD were Addressees (interaction effect of group 
and role, ​F​(1,50) = 11.31, ​p​ = .001, partial ​η​2​ = 0.18; no main effect of role, ​p​ = .61; Typical vs. 
ASD Communicator success, ​t​(50) = 1.80, ​p​ = .08, ​d​ = 0.52, 95% CI = [-0.04 1.07]; Typical vs. 
ASD Addressee success, ​t​(50) = 3.26, ​p​ = .002, ​d​ = 0.94, 95% CI = [0.36 1.51]). Taken together 
with their misalignment, this finding suggest that individuals with ASD struggled to both produce 
and comprehend behaviors in light of the context of interaction. 
 
  
 
Fig. 2 - Preserved cognitive abilities and communicative propensities in ASD.​ (​A​)​ ​Planning time, 
movement time, the number of moves, time spent on target and other locations of the game board were 
consistently matched between neurotypical and autistic individuals. Individuals with and without ASD also 
exhibited a comparable heterogeneity of communicative signals throughout the task, and were similarly 
inclined to re-use signals that were previously understood by their partner as indicated by the comparable 
slopes of the frequency and success distributions. Times are measured in seconds. (​B​) Individuals with 
and without ASD showed a similar propensity for modifying their behavior as Communicators if not 
understood previously. (​C​) Similar to neurotypical individuals, individuals with ASD spontaneously spent 
more time on communicatively relevant locations of the game board as Communicators, discriminating 
them from other visited locations for the benefit of their communicative partner. 
 
4. Discussion 
The findings reported in this study demarcate a key cognitive challenge intrinsic to human 
interpersonal communication that individuals with ASD struggle to overcome, despite having 
otherwise indistinguishable performance from neurotypical adults across several task metrics. 
This study shows that communicative impairments in ASD are not simply a consequence of 
neglect of communicative demands during interaction nor of altered sensory processing, motor 
performance, interaction memory, social motivation or attention, or cognitive perseveration. As 
the communicative demands of the current task prohibit recourse to known biological and 
 linguistic cues, ASD communicative impairment was also unaffected by altered processing of 
those stimuli ​(Constantino et al., 2017; J. Cook et al., 2009; Hobson et al., 1988; Hutchins & 
Brien, 2016; Nackaerts et al., 2012; Silverman et al., 2010)​. Furthermore, individuals with ASD 
showed comparable ability and motivation to neurotypical individuals in producing intelligible 
communicative behaviors. They even modulated the use of these behaviors based on their 
partners’ responses, questioning suggestions of universally diminished social motivation or 
impaired cognitive flexibility in ASD ​(Chevallier et al., 2012; Geurts et al., 2009)​.  
Yet, individuals with ASD struggled to align the conceptualizations of their 
communicative signals with those of their interaction partners when the problem space afforded 
multiple solutions. This impairment could be isolated because the novel communicative setting 
prevented access to pre-existing contextual cues that cognitively-able individuals with ASD can 
capitalize on to resolve ambiguity ​(Au-Yeung, Kaakinen, Liversedge, & Benson, 2015; 
Birmingham, Stanley, Nair, & Adolphs, 2015; Branigan, Tosi, & Gillespie-Smith, 2016; Brewer, 
Biotti, Bird, & Cook, 2017; Hahn, Snedeker, & Rabagliati, 2015; Nadig, Seth, & Sasson, 2015; 
Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse, & Geurts, 2009)​. Under these experimentally-generated 
conditions, built to recreate the fleeting ambiguities of everyday interaction, communication 
requires more than pruning a decision tree of possible signals or iteratively optimizing 
behavioral outcomes ​(Botvinick & Weinstein, 2014; Donoso, Collins, & Koechlin, 2014; Keysers 
& Perrett, 2004)​. Despite their ability to consistently produce, modify, and remember 
interpretable communicative behaviors, i.e. behaviors that were also part of the neurotypical 
solution space, autistic individuals were less likely to select signals in light of their partner’s 
behaviors. This resulted in greater misalignment, especially when full- and mixed-ASD pairs 
were presented with ambiguous problems. In contrast, neurotypical individuals navigated 
through epochs of communicative ambiguity by considering and aligning to their partner’s recent 
signals. The observed differences in task performance between neurotypical and full- and 
mixed-ASD pairs arose specifically from this reduced ability to produce and comprehend 
communicative behaviors informed by their recent communicative history. This observation 
explains why autistic individuals are vulnerable to the transient and interaction-specific 
ambiguities in everyday social situations, and provides novel boundaries to the general notion 
that ASD is linked to altered mentalizing abilities ​(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Happé, 1993; 
Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015)​. Although adults with ASD can communicate on the 
basis of presumed knowledge about a generic partner, they fail to dynamically update that 
conceptual knowledge according to the ongoing interaction with a specific individual. Precise 
 characterization of dynamic conceptual updating might provide a new window into 
understanding autistic communication, and how signals derive their meaning from the 
communicative context in which they are embedded. 
Failures in using the conceptual space implied by the ongoing interaction are likely to 
have two important consequences. First, those failures might affect the recognition of the 
relevance of a communicative signal for jointly coordinating the shared conceptual space. 
Second, those failures might affect the resolution of the ambiguity intrinsic in those signals. It 
remains to be seen whether other social deficits observed in ASD (and controlled for in this 
study), such as abnormalities in eye contact, facial expressions, speech, and turn-taking 
(Madipakkam, Rothkirch, Dziobek, & Sterzer, 2017; Shriberg et al., 2001; Tager-Flusberg & 
Anderson, 1991)​, could in fact be downstream consequences of difficulties in predicting and 
monitoring mutual understanding ​(Stolk et al., 2016)​. It will also be of interest to know whether 
and how conceptual alignment deficits interact with cognitive traits and environmental factors to 
give rise to the considerable behavioral and developmental variability observed in ASD, opening 
the way for principled interventions to improve communication between autistic and neurotypical 
individuals ​(Edey et al., 2016; Fusaroli, Weed, Fein, & Naigles, 2018; Greenberg, Warrier, 
Allison, & Baron-Cohen, 2018; Perry, Levy-Gigi, Richter-Levin, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2015; Stolk, 
Hunnius, et al., 2013; Stolk, Noordzij, Volman, et al., 2014)​. This work illustrates that to answer 
these key questions, it is both feasible and pertinent to study autistic individuals engaged in 
social interactions with others. This is the natural context in which communication is learned, 
where it is used, and where individuals with ASD experience difficulties. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study provides a novel and precise characterization of communicative deficits in ASD, one 
of its core diagnostic features ​(American Psychiatric Association, 2013)​. The results suggest 
that individuals with ASD and neurotypical individuals would be equally able and motivated to 
communicate if human communication could be reduced to an information transfer problem in a 
signal encoding–decoding framework ​(Shannon, 1948)​. Yet, the ASD communicative deficits 
observed here indicate that human communication is best characterized as a solution to a 
conceptual alignment challenge, organized to predict and monitor mutual understanding ​(Stolk 
et al., 2016)​. This study illustrates how the efficacy of the evolutionarily anomalous human 
communicative system is severely limited without this key interactional ingredient. 
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 Table S1 - Autism Quotient (AQ) score and Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule (ADOS) 
classification for twenty-two participants diagnosed with ASD.​ Scores on the Social Interaction and 
Communication modules of the ADOS were totalled in their ADOS score, and all three scores were then 
used to classify the participants. Participants were classified as follows; ​Autism​: a ​Communication score 
of 3+, Social Interaction score of 6+, and a total score of 10+; ​Autism Spectrum​: a Communication score 
of 2+, Social Interaction score of 4+, and a total score of 7+; ​None​: if any of the criteria for Autism 
Spectrum were not met. These individuals were included based on an independent diagnosis by a 
clinician and reported a similar degree of autistic traits on the AQ as the individuals who did meet the 
ADOS criteria. 
Pair AQ ADOS Social Interaction Communication Classification 
A 39 9 7 2 Autism Spectrum 
A 41 6 4 2 None 
B 42 10 6 4 Autism 
B 35 10 5 5 Autism Spectrum 
C 36 8 6 2 Autism Spectrum 
C 19 11 7 4 Autism 
D 29 2 1 1 None 
D 37 11 6 5 Autism 
E 31 9 6 3 Autism Spectrum 
E 36 6 5 1 None 
F 35 9 6 3 Autism Spectrum 
F 28 7 3 4 None 
I 19 10 5 5 Autism Spectrum 
J 22 9 6 3 Autism Spectrum 
K 46 8 6 2 Autism Spectrum 
L 39 1 1 0 None 
L 46 7 5 2 Autism Spectrum 
M 23 9 7 2 Autism Spectrum 
N 28 11 8 3 Autism 
O 27 5 5 0 None 
P 21 8 6 2 Autism Spectrum 
Q 37 4 3 1 None 
 
  
 Table S2 - Communicative signals devised and used by Communicators for communicating the 
Addressee’s target location and orientation.​ The descriptions do not include completion of the 
Communicator’s own target location and orientation, nor their effectiveness for the various problem types. 
Signal L was not observed in the current sample population, whereas signals B, Q and R had not been 
reported before. This table is not a comprehensive list of all possible signals for this task, but only a 
compilation of observed signals to date. Signal occurrences are calculated on the entire sample 
population. 
Communicative 
signal 
Description Occurrence 
A - pause The Communicator spends more time at the Addressee’s target 
location than at any other visited location on the game board. 
Used by all pairs during the first four interactions, which involved 
target configurations consisting of identical geometric shapes 
across the players (e.g., circle-circle combinations)  that did not 
require any rotation. 
37.4% 
B - prolonged 
pause 
The Communicator pauses on the Addressee’s target location 
for periods of time proportionate to the number of rotations the 
Addressee needs to make. 
2.9% 
C - match The Communicator matches the Addressee’s target orientation 
by rotating in place at the Addressee’s target location (the 
players’ shapes are identical). 
5.5% 
D - rotate The Communicator goes to the Addressee’s target location and 
rotates in place however many times required for the Addressee 
to reach the target orientation. 
0.7% 
E - entry The Communicator enters the Addressee’s target location from 
the direction the Addressee’s shape should be pointing. 
0.1% 
F - exit The Communicator exits the Addressee’s target location along 
the direction the Addressee’s shape should be pointing. 
1.7% 
G - line The Communicator steps out multiple steps from and returns to 
the Addressee’s target location to indicate the direction the 
Addressee’s shape should be pointing. 
4.5% 
H - single wiggle 
from target 
The Communicator steps in and out of the Addressee’s target 
location in the direction of the Addressee’s target orientation. 
10.0% 
I - multiple wiggles 
from target 
The Communicator steps in and out of the Addressee’s target 
location multiple times in the direction of the Addressee’s target 
orientation (more emphatic version of H). 
3.8% 
J - wiggle count 
from target 
The Communicator goes to the Addressee’s target location and 
steps in and out of that location however many times the 
Addressee needs to rotate to reach the target orientation. 
16.0% 
 K - wiggle count 
from target 
neighbor  
The Communicator goes to a square adjacent to the 
Addressee’s target location and steps into and out of the 
Addressee’s target location however many times the Addressee 
needs to rotate to reach the target orientation. This signal will 
result in one less visit to the target location than J. 
1.2% 
L - wiggle from 
center 
The Communicator visits the Addressee’s target location 
followed by the game board’s center, and steps in and out of the 
central location however many times the Addressee needs to 
rotate to reach the target orientation. 
0.0% 
M - exit from center The Communicator exits the central start location along the 
direction the Addressee’s shape should be pointing, before 
going to the Addressee’s target location. 
2.0% 
N - wiggle 
elsewhere 
The Communicator steps out in the direction of the Addressee’s 
target orientation at a game board location other than the 
Addressee’s target location or the central location. 
0.2% 
O - circle target 
count 
The Communicator goes to the Addressee’s target location and 
circles around it however many times the Addressee needs to 
rotate. 
5.3% 
P - circle target 
direction 
The Communicator goes to the Addressee’s target location and 
circles around it in the direction of the Addressee’s target 
orientation. 
0.9% 
Q - circle board 
direction 
The Communicator goes to the Addressee’s target location and 
circles along the border of the entire board in the direction of the 
Addressee’s target orientation. 
1.0% 
R - circle board 
count 
The Communicator goes to the Addressee’s target location and 
circles along the border of the entire board however many times 
the Addressee needs to rotate. 
1.3% 
S - draw The Communicator uses a large section of the game board to 
sketch the Addressee’s overall target configuration. 
2.1% 
U - unclassified Signals that could not be classified or involved procedural errors 
by the Communicator. 
3.6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. S1 - Replication of Figure 1F with trials ordered from lowest to highest ambiguity to better 
illustrate the relationship between pairwise alignment and problem ambiguity in each group. 
  
 Movie S1​ - Communicative alignment in a neurotypical pair. ​This movie features 3 interactions 
illustrating how neurotypical individuals converge on a shared meaning of a communicative behavior in 
this game. In trial 27, the blue player, who is the Communicator of that interaction, steps out from the 
orange player’s target location repeatedly in the direction the orange player’s triangle should be pointing 
(signal I). The orange player, however, interprets this behavior differently from how it was intended. She 
rotates her triangular token twice, corresponding to the number of times the blue player stepped out from 
the presumed target location (signal J), thereby ending up facing in a direction different from the target 
orientation. During her own turn as a Communicator in trial 28, the orange player expands on her 
previous (incorrect) interpretation by visiting, with ostensible emphasis, the blue player’s target location 
three times, which is however many times the blue player needs to rotate to reach the target orientation 
with her triangle (signal J). Arguably informed by both her partner’s previous interpretation and current 
emphatic behavior, this proposition is rapidly understood and agreed upon by the blue player who 
correctly interprets the signal (J) in trial 28 and decides to use it at her turn as a Communicator in trial 29. 
That is, in trial 29, she steps out from the orange player’s target location once to indicate to the orange 
player that she needs to rotate her triangle once (signal J). The pair continues to successfully apply this 
signal until trial 80 wherever possible (not shown in the video).  
 
Movie S2​ - Communicative misalignment in an ASD pair. ​This movie illustrates how cognitively able 
individuals diagnosed with ASD (IQs of 135 and 118) struggle to align their communication with one 
another over the course of 5 interactions, both when selecting their own and interpreting the other’s 
behavior. In trial 34, the orange player, who is the Communicator of that interaction, visits the blue 
player’s target location however many times the blue player needs to rotate to reach the target orientation 
(signal K). In trial 35, the blue player, who is now the Communicator, draws a line on the game board to 
indicate the direction the orange player’s triangle should be pointing (signal G). The orange player, 
however, interprets this behavior according to his own signal (signal K) and rotates his triangle three 
times, which is how many times the blue player visited the presumed target location. Also during his own 
turn as a Communicator in trial 36, the orange player uses the number of visits to indicate orientation 
(signal K). In a similar vein, the blue player interprets that behavior not according to his partner’s but to his 
own signaling (signal G) and points his triangle in the direction the orange player’s circle stepped out from 
the target location. In trial 37, both players reach a successful outcome. This surprising success is 
presumably due to the blue player incidentally visiting the orange player’s presumed target location three 
times (in line with orange player’s signal K) while executing his line drawing signal (G). Trial 38 reinforces 
the hypothetical incidental nature of the signal overlap in trial 37, with the orange player visiting the target 
location twice to indicate two rotations (signal K). Yet the blue player points his triangle in the direction the 
orange player’s circle stepped out (equaling 3 rotations), consistent with his signal G. The same 
 misalignment continues to trial 44 when both players switch to different strategies each and the 
misalignment repeats (not shown in the video). 
